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Analysis of the dynamics of informal governance in the European Union (EU) has established a toehold in the scholarly attempt to map the regional integration phenomenon; just beyond the fin du siècle, the attempt amounts to a cross-Atlantic endeavor with much ground to cover.  Yet it is an auspicious trek, for mainstream regionalism scholarship has been marching in distinctly different directions for years, even decades.  Since the early days of what has become the EU, memorably mapped out by boundary-breaking cartographers like Ernst Hass and Leon Lindberg, regionalism scholarship of the non-Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) variety has trained its sites almost exclusively on the formal sphere of European integration—viz. entities based on full-fledged legal rules which regulate EU governance and are subject to external judicial review.  While these and many ensuing mappings of the EU’s formal sphere have proved highly necessary and often insightful, European integration scholarship has virtually ignored a more obscure if no less important piece of territory:  the EU’s informal sphere.
Leaving the informal sphere as uncharted scholarly territory, however, has come at a cost.  Indeed, scholars who confine their territorial mapping exclusively to the EU’s formal sphere may not avoid the fate of the six blind men of Indostan, who were each partially accurate in their description of the elephant although tellingly inaccurate when it came to understanding the whole nature of the beast.  Those scholars engaged in charting the EU’s informal sphere may yet save the regionalism sub-field from a similarly blind fate.  In doing so they have the potential to substantially deepen our understanding of the world’s most prominent political experiment to date, for the quotidian outcomes of EU governance may not be fully comprehended without an understanding of the recursive relationship between the EU’s formal and informal rules (the latter of which tend to be as consistently adhered to by EU actors as the former).
This paper seeks to aid in this endeavor.  It will do so firstly by anchoring the later empirical sections in the theory of rational choice historical institutionalism (RCHI), a necessary grounding that attempts to avoid a somewhat common trend of regionalist scholarship—viz. describing empirically without explaining theoretically.  This theoretical hybrid of two of new institutionalism’s three variants seeks to compensate for the individual weaknesses of RCI (rational choice institutionalism) and HI (historical institutionalism) while accentuating their strengths.  In essence, RCHI theory is based on rationalist assumptions but takes account of the increasing returns of political phenomena.  
Secondly, the paper will attempt to map a nascent area of research in the empirical section, viz. that of the effect of external informal rules on the EU’s internal governance.  It will subject RCHI’s hypotheses to the ongoing cross-Atlantic dispute between the American and EU antitrust authorities, which reached a boiling point when the Commission vetoed the merger between GE and Honeywell in 2001.  As a result, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Commission agreed to a code of best practices for regulating mergers, which is now being put to the test with regard to the EU’s regulation of Microsoft among other multinational behemoths.  Thus, this paper will examine external informal dynamics of the EU, which in more general terms has the potential to become a growth area for future regionalism research.

RCHI Theory
Ahead of hammering out the theoretical framework, it is necessary to address some foundational conceptual issues.​[1]​  With regard to institutions and institutionalism it is important to emphasize a distinction too rarely made in regionalism scholarship, particularly in studies of the EU:  between organizations and institutions.  Inside the EU and throughout the media, the Council, Commission, and Parliament—a.k.a. the Three—are referred to as “institutions.”  Technically speaking, however, they are organizations.  Courts, legislatures, and bureaucratic agencies are examples of organizations.  Organizations constitute collective political actors, whereas institutions constitute rules—as opposed to actors.
Following definitions by North and Eggertsson, an institution comprises either a single or complex set of rules which govern the interaction of political actors, i.e. guiding principles which both prescribe and proscribe behavior and are set out in the form of prescriptions – either formally established or tacitly understood.​[2]​  Institutions constrain actors; they are not actors themselves; their purpose is to solve social problems, which they accomplish via providing incentives or disincentives for action.​[3]​
Formal institutions are conscious creations of political actors and strictly enforceable, while informal institutions – not synonymous with norms – are sometimes intended and sometimes the result of unintended patterns that accrue over time on the basis of repeated interactions.  The key distinction between informal and formal institutions is that, unlike the latter, the parties to informal institutions are not legally bound to their rules; in terms of enforcement, aggrieved parties can only rely on political sanctions that carry negligible legal force. In contrast, the rules of formal institutions are legally enforceable by a third party judicial body – in the EU the ECJ – which possesses the authority to issue binding legal sanctions.
Intended informal institutions appear in two forms (informal accords comprise at least a single rule/institution and are created by more than one actor, whereas informal precepts are created by a single actor); their unintended counterparts are properly designated as informal conventions.   Also found among informal institutions are norms (rule-based standards of appropriateness:  like the others they are rule-based, but also morality-based; and they can be intentional or unintentional).  Whereas accords, precepts, and conventions are functional siblings, norms are more akin to cousins—though still in the same institutional family.  
Because institutions affect policy outcomes – and policy-making powers – actors not only have preferences over institutions, but also compete to bring about their preferred versions of them.​[4]​  Institutional innovation, therefore, is tantamount either to the creation of new rules or making changes in existing rules.  Consequently, change in the EU’s institutional milieu has the potential to reallocate power among the Three, rendering each more or less able to achieve its own policy preferences.
Consequential institutional creation occurs not only in the EU’s formal sphere, but also its informal sphere.  Informal rule creation by the EU’s primary organizational actors connotes a tension between prescription and convention in the EU, i.e. a disparity between what is supposed to happen according to law – formal (de jure) dynamics – and what actually happens in practice – informal (de facto) dynamics.  Sometimes serving to reinforce to the formal sphere, at other times to modify it, the rule-encompassing political bargains that underpin informal accords constitute the crux of the EU's “informal inter-organizational dynamics”—a subset of the larger domain of informal governance.​[5]​
Informal governance has been defined by Christiansen et al. in the following manner:  “We define governance as the production of authoritative decisions which are not produced by a single hierarchical structure, such as a democratically elected legislative assembly and government, but instead arise from the interaction of a plethora of public and private, collective and individual actors … Governance is informal when participation in the decision-making process is not yet or cannot be codified and publicly enforced.”​[6]​  Whereas van Tatenhove and Mak define it as “those non-codified settings of day-to-day interaction concerning policy issues, in which the participation of actors, the formation of coalitions, the processes of agenda-setting and (preliminary) decision-making are not structured by pre-given sets of rules or formal institutions.  This definition of informal practices emphasizes the ‘rules of the game’ and the specific way rules guide and constrain the behavior of actors in the interplay of formal and informal practices.”​[7]​
These definitions are most useful:  Christiansen et al. successfully demarcate the terrain of network-based informal governance, while van Tatenhove and Mak incorporate this swath of terrain and trek further in the direction of rule-based informal governance.  Yet, neither definition adequately charts an additional swath of territory, viz. explicit rule creation in the context of rule-based informal governance—partly because of the need to view governance more expansively as a process by which actors (governmental and non-governmental) and rules (formal and informal) interact to steer political behavior and outcomes in society.​[8]​  Nonetheless, there appears to be a way to bridge the Christiansen et al. approach of network-based informal governance that does not occur according to any prescribed or already established rules, with the Stacey and Rittberger approach of rule-based informal governance that maintains there are numerous informal rules in the EU, some consequential even to the point of being adhered to by actors when they clash with formal treaty-based rules.  
Such a bridge would need to incorporate both codified and non-codified settings.  In this vein, informal governance is engaged in by actors who are either making decisions/policies or altering the rules of policy-making; furthermore, informal governance either sets precedents or it does not.  The above definitions capture informal governance that does not set precedents in the form of new rules/institutions; however, they are unable to capture the informal dynamics that actively create new rules, which remain in effect for future political interactions.  Thus, a potentially useful addition to the superb van Tatenhove and Mak mimeo may be the process of creating informal rules – informal dynamics – that often have a recursive relationship with formal rules.​[9]​  Perhaps it would be useful to conceive of informal governance either in terms of two variants or as an additional axis, viz. precedent setting and non-precedent setting informal governance.
  An important research question is whether informal governance – in either informal dynamics or policy network form – actually contributes to further integration or not, i.e. transfers of sovereignty.  If evidence can be found that informal governance contributes to an integration outcome – i.e. explain a portion of its variance – then such would constitute interregnum integration.  As opposed to history-making integration – transferring sovereignty from the national level to supranational actors – interregnum integration refers to national-to-supranational sovereignty transfers either on the basis of court-related jurisprudence or on the basis of informal rule creation, which is to say that the decisions to transfer and design sovereignty on the supranational level either flow from interpretative rulings of the ECJ or are encapsulated in informal bargains among organizational actors that lack both a legal basis and a third-party external enforcer.​[10]​  The primary source of interregnum integration is not the Member States, but rather the Council’s supranational competitors (particularly the Parliament).
Now we can turn to the paper’s theoretical framework.  Whereas RCI treats institutions as variables that intervene between actors’ preferences and outcomes—institutions are thin—sociological institutionalism (SI) and some HI work depict institutions as independent variables which do not only constrain options and structure choice situations, they themselves constitute actors’ preferences—institutions are thick.​[11]​  Thus far, institutionalist theoretical approaches have primarily worked with one of two conceptions of institutions:  either as rules constraining behavior (RCI and HI) or as norms and/or culture shaping as well as altering actor preferences (SI and some HI).
To explain processes of institutional change, however, it may be essential to combine at least two of these approaches, as the possibility of institutional change may not only be hindered by prevailing resource distributions among actors and formal rules, but also by transaction costs and increasing returns—and perhaps even by prevailing shared expectations (norms) about the desirability of particular institutions which are grounded in ideology or political culture.  It would appear worthwhile to combine approaches by specifically proffering a theoretical fusion of RCI and HI.  The payoff from such a theoretical move can be cashed in via compensating for the former’s deficiencies related to persistence and the latter’s deficiencies related to change.  
The theoretical framework of this paper is grounded in a hybrid of RCI and HI approaches, viz. a rational choice historical institutionalist theory (RCHI) applied to a unit of analysis comprising the EU’s inter-organizational interaction.​[12]​  Prior to elucidating hypotheses, it is necessary to anchor them in a theory grounded broadly in the strategic choice approach.​[13]​  In addition to the unitary actor assumption, RCHI first and foremost is methodologically individualist in that it posits that actors perceive their interests, rank them in terms of preferences, and maximize their utility by choosing the option they believe to be the most efficient means to their desired end.  Nonetheless, this hybrid theory allows for rationality to be bounded, information to be incomplete, and actor beliefs not to be infallibly rational.  This amounts to an overall assumption of weak rationality; thus, the theory postulates that actors merely behave as if they were rational.​[14]​
The hybrid nature of this RCHI theory becomes clear as institutions are introduced into the mix.  Akin to Levi and picking up on Pierson’s pioneering work, this theory assumes that actors are inveterate designers of institutions, which have the effect of constraining their subsequent choices.  It further assumes that actors making decisions may have divergent interests from those affected by their decisions, and additionally that power is unequally distributed among the designers of institutions and among those affected by them.​[15]​  In other words, actors’ choices and subsequent behavior are path dependent.  The behavioral paths that actors travel along – the better metaphor may be channels – are demarcated by the very status quo institutions they created; however, due to the accrual of increasing returns these institutions tend to persist.  For once established, other arrangements ranging from political deals to newer institutions become contingent on the status quo institutions, thereby adding to the costs of altering them.  Thus, contrary to RCI postulates, in their persistence institutions continue to channel actors’ behavior:  institutions are not especially thin.
Nonetheless, although increasing returns raise the costs of altering institutions even when it may otherwise be rational to do so, change is possible—even probable.  Thus, RCHI theory also posits that actors will change the institutions constraining their decisions when the benefits from utility gains to be made begin to outweigh the accumulated costs (included those that will have accrued from increasing returns).  In other words, at some threshold point that incorporates the build-up of increasing returns, the costs of change will no longer be restrictive. At this point, ceteris paribus, actors will alter the institutional rules of the game.
Up to this point an implicit assumption of comparative statics has been made. However, it is important to relax this assumption and incorporate strategic interaction into the theoretical framework.  A given political actor does not exist in a vacuum; rather, it must interact with other actors, each of whom has its own set of interests and preferences.  Also behaving as if they are rational, they pursue their own strategies.  Because of this, the success of any actor’s individual strategy is contingent up on the strategies of other actors; as such, in formulating one’s strategy, anticipated reaction is necessary – for the other actors as well.  Unless actors’ preferences are similar, their strategies will clash and necessarily introduce the necessity of bridging their differences, with the result ranging along a continuum between conflict and cooperation.
As such, actors will change the institutions constraining their decisions when the benefits from utility gains to be made begin to outweigh the costs accrued from increasing returns, contingent upon the preferences and strategies of other actors with whom they are interdependent.  Moreover, all actors are not created equal.  This may not be problematic if there is a majority party in a legislature that can easily dispense with opposition once the benefits of altering the rules outweigh the transaction costs.  However, in further relaxing the comparative statics assumption, even weak actors can cause problems for powerful actors over time.  With a temporal assumption operating, actor strategies will tend to militate in favor of tit-for-tat rather than defection in a prisoner’s dilemma.​[16]​  As such, the likelihood of bargaining thereby increases, for weaker actors may have leverage based on their ability to obstruct if not compel; powerful actors may therefore have incentives to bargain in order to mitigate the obstructionist motivations of weaker opponents.
Under this set of RCHI assumptions, the threshold point for institutional change also depends on strategic interaction, which may result in a lowering of this point below where it would have been based on transaction and other costs alone.  Thus, repeated interaction and multiple plays of the game may (or may not) decrease the stickiness of institutions, for there is variability not only among increasing returns but also – and most importantly – the vicissitudes of bargaining among multiple actors.  It is the not entirely predictable outcome of bargaining – based on the incomplete information assumption – that partially eliminates and partially “resurrects” the multiple equilibrium problem.  Institutional equilibria are thus likely to be at least somewhat persistent, but probably not ineluctably so.  As institutions are assumed to be neither too thick nor too thin in this RCHI theory, it compensates equally for RCI’s putative inability to theorize persistence and for HI’s putative inability to theorize change.
Compensating for their deficiencies also necessitates greater theoretical precision than is the norm in standard renditions of both RCI and HI.  Indeed, it is incumbent on institutionalist scholarship to indicate the conditions under which change in a given scenario is expected, thus enabling it to elucidate how change is likely to occur in addition to why. In this way, a causal story can move from being an approach to an actual theory, which involves generating specific hypotheses that will specify the probabilistic conditions for change – and testing them.  Not only are sophisticated versions of HI quite compatible with RCI, but furthermore for them to gain sufficient causal leverage they need to move beyond the mere metaphor of history.​[17]​  In this manner RCHI may help to explain the variance of institutional change in the EU, which is potentially consequential for an array of policy and political outcomes.  
Concerning the hypotheses, in taking into account dependent variables of both institutional design/creation and institutional change/adjustment, to a certain extent their primary purpose is to provide a general theoretical framing.  In other words, additional independent variables may be needed to explain specific outcomes of both types, leading to other auxiliary hypotheses beyond those presented below.  The broader hypotheses set out here are aimed at putting into a place a causal framework specific enough to ground any empirical work in a particular theoretical approach qua theory, while being flexible enough to allow for necessary causal idiosyncrasies in a variety of empirical areas.  Whereas the earlier propositions stemmed from existing approaches in the literature, herein lie the RCHI hypotheses concerning formal and informal spheres of EU policy-making.

Hypothesis 1: If changes in the formal rules are problematic in practical terms, actors may become motivated to create informal rules in order to compensate for deficiencies.

Actors may see themselves compelled to opt for the creation of informal institutions, as it is difficult for actors to anticipate all possible consequences of a formal institutional or “contractual” arrangement (see, for example, Pollack, 2003 and Abbott and Snidal, 2000).  Informal rules in this regard can function either to fill in obvious gaps in the Treaty that prevent efficient policy-making or to solve minor problems in the formal rules – sort of to iron out the wrinkles.  The dynamics surrounding the creation of this type of informal rules are relatively consensual and thereby cooperative; as such, the outcome is fairly predictable.  Such rules violate neither the letter nor the spirit of the Treaty.


Hypothesis 2: If changes in the formal rules are determined to be unsatisfactory in political preference terms, aggrieved actors may become motivated to create informal rules.

In contrast, dynamics surrounding rules of this type are overtly political and thereby contentious. Thus, the outcome varies because influence attempts by the Three may succeed or fail, due to specific factors such as preference disparities, power disparities, or differences in actors’ time horizons.  Hix (2002), Farrell and Héritier (2003) as well as Lindner and Rittberger (2003) have demonstrated, for instance, that differences in time horizons between the Member States in the Council and the European Parliament prompted the latter to adopt a confrontational strategy in both legislative and budgetary policy-making with the ultimate goal to challenge the Council’s formal rule interpretation of certain legislative und budgetary policy-making procedures.  Given Member States’ short-term policy orientation vis-à-vis Parliament’s long-term orientation towards challenging the distribution of power among the EU’s organizational actors, Parliament was able to alter the way legislative and budgetary policy-making procedures were effectively applied by having an informal institution supersede a formal, Treaty-based one.  In the context of this special issue, auxiliary hypotheses may be useful in that rule creation attempts may be unilateral and thus worked out in practice (e.g. when the Parliament uses its internal Rules of Procedure as a battering ram against the Council) or the Three may engage in direct negotiations in order to deal with rule creation (e.g. in tri-lateral informal accords).

Hypothesis 3: If informal rules that gain credence over time and are deemed satisfactory (particularly from the Council’s perspective), Member State negotiators may become motivated to formalize them via their inclusion in amending treaties.

In instances such as this, informal rules are “swept up” into the formal sphere and reincarnated as fully-fledged legal rules that are enshrined in the Treaty.  This is not the case for all informal rules; however, it does intermittently occur primarily because a broad consensus as to the workability and acceptability of certain informal rules is achieved. Moreover, Member States may wish to sort of update them and/or infuse them with full democratic legitimacy.  Thus, in terms of specific conditions for formalization of informal institutions, we expect this to occur 1) when the median voter Member State helps form a dominant actor coalition in the Council for amending the Treaty in such a fashion (i.e. precisely when this and other Member States determine that informal institution—or set of them—is workable and not too anemic to it long-term interests), and  2) when the Parliament does not successfully oppose a particular instance of sweeping up via an issue linkage strategy (paradoxically, on occasion the Parliament wishes an informal accord to remain informal—e.g. the budgetary accords, for flexibility reasons).

Hypothesis 4: If informal rules gain credence over time and a consensus as to their satisfactory nature as informal entities is achieved, Member States and other actors may become motivated not to formalize them.

The EU’s organizational actors responsible for informal rule creation may wish to retain a degree of flexibility in the acquis, specifically in terms of facing fewer hurdles to altering informal rules in the future.  By their very nature, informal rules are far easier to alter than formal rules; all that may be required is a so-called “gentlemen’s agreement.”  Thus, whether by full consensus or not organizational actors may seek to maintain certain rules in the informal sphere where change is much less prohibitive.  The legalization literature emphasizes that negotiating formal institutional agreements among a group of heterogeneous actors may be a very costly process given, for example, the potentially high switching costs from an informal to a formal institutional arrangement. Maintaining a degree of flexibility – provided for by informal arrangements – can be particularly important “when uncertainty or one sticky problem threatens to upset a larger ‘package deal’.” (Abbott and Snidal, 2000:  445)

Hypothesis 5:  If Member State principals delegate authority to their own representatives at the supranational level (i.e. the Council’s Secretariat and Working Groups), these representatives may create internal rules that – for efficiency and other motivations – may diverge from the principals’ intentions.

This is an obvious reference to the Council, and the idea here is that there is a distinct possibility that even in policy areas where competence is retained by the Council, this collective actor’s internal actors on one of three levels – Working Groups, Coreper I or II, or specific councils like Foreign Affairs – may create new informal rules that militate in favor of small transfers of sovereignty.  For example, rules may be creating that make compromise easier to achieve, even in policy areas where the Treaty calls for unanimity in the Council.  Motivations for this eventuality may comprise the necessity of efficiency in decision-making, responses to norms militating in favor of consensus, or represent unintended consequences of other decisions.

Hypothesis 6: If Member State principals delegate authority for preparatory informal rule creation to specialized agents, they may not be able to control the precise nature of the outcome.

Due to sunk costs and other causal factors Member States may be committed up front to the outcomes from specialized agent activities.  For example, the Committee of Governors proved to be a collective agent that shirked to a fairly significant degree and created a European Central Bank (ECB) edifice that amounted to an offer that the Member States, for various reasons, “couldn’t refuse.”

Hypothesis 7:  If the European Court of  Justice (ECJ) creates new integrative rules, then Member State principals may not be willing to pay the costs of “overruling” them via new legislation even when they prefer to do so.

If the ECJ issues rulings in cases brought by one of the Three against another, new rules regarding inter-organizational relations in its ruling decisions are often integrative, e.g. those that established direct effect and supremacy.  Where these rules run counter to Member State preferences, instead of “overruling” the ECJ via the creation of new legislation – even when they prefer to do so – the Council may simply adjust its behavior to accommodate the new rules.  Although technically speaking these rules are formal, having been created by the ECJ itself, they nonetheless possess an informal quality in that they alter the acquis akin to the way in which informal accords do so.  

In other words, these rules are more similar to informal rules in the way in which they “adjust” the acquis, as opposed to formal rules stemming from primary or secondary sources that possess the standard fully-fledged legal quality in obliging all actors to act in accordance with them.  Quasi-informal rules, if you like, are the subset of technically formal rules created by the Court that involve changes marginal enough that they do not kick up a tempest in the Member State teapot, yet in and of themselves comprise adjustments to the acquis that involve small-scale transfers of sovereignty.  More often than not, Member States have not bothered to re-legislate, but have instead simply adjusted their behavior to them moving forward.


External Informal Dynamics and Multinational Behemoths
	Typically, informal dynamics and informal governance are explored by scholars within the confines of the EU political system.  However, it may be the case that actors outside of the Three—the main policy-making actors in the EU—also create informal rules that impact how the Three behave and interact to make policy.  An excellent early study of informal governance of this kind can be found in an article by Margaret McCown.​[18]​  Whereas McCown examines the role of the ECJ in this regard, it may further be the case that actors completely outside the EU can create informal rules that have an important impact inside the EU.  Indeed, this may well be a growth area not yet explored in the burgeoning literature on EU-based informal governance.  This section will examine joint informal rule creation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Commission in the area of guidelines for regulating mergers of multi-national companies (MNCs), the behemoths that benefit the most from the lack of hierarchy—i.e. world government—in the international arena.
Divergence between competition policies in the EU and U.S. and the cross-Atlantic political discord created by the application of divergent policies has recently led to greater cooperation in the area of merger regulation.  Indeed, in 2003 the Commission and the DOJ forged consensus on a joint accord of “best practices” for policing mergers in their own respective bailiwicks.  Although created by government entities, the informal rules that comprise these “best practices” are intended to be a strong influence on how the Commission and DOJ separately engage in merger regulation.  These rules lack a formal legal quality, but that is unlikely to weaken their influence over a crucial aspect of government regulatory activity on both sides of the Atlantic.
Indeed, this best practices informal accord was agreed as an institutional solution to a fierce political conflict the U.S. and EU governments, viz. the considerable fallout over the Commission’s blocking of the proposed GE-Honeywell merger in 2001 and its near blocking of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger in 1997.  The tempest that ensued from the mid-2001 decision roiled the political waters until, by sheer necessity, the erstwhile rivals in the DOJ and Commission were able to establish a working group that led eventually to the best practices accord.  Without a legal quality to the accord’s newly created institutions, one might wonder how they will be enforced in lieu of a world court with jurisdiction over MNC mergers.  The answer is likely that the accord will be enforced informally, via the levying of political sanctions by either party in light of any reneging by the other.  However, are the costs of reneging likely to be high enough as to compel the actors to abide by these new institutions despite their informality?
	This section will seek to explain the outcome of the best practices accord and analyze the degree to which its informal institutions are likely to be complied with.  First it will discuss this phenomenon in the context of RCHI theory.  Then it will sketch out the history of the cross-Atlantic discord in the GE-Honeywell case.  And finally it will examine the formation of the accord and the likelihood of its remaining in place in lieu of any third-party enforcement mechanism.
This empirical section will also test all seven RCHI hypotheses, but the seemingly most pertinent of them are Hypotheses 2, 3 and 7:  the Council, Commission, and the Parliament may or may not be dissatisfied with the status quo allocation of power/authority and seek to create new informal rules; Member States may or may not seek to formalize extent informal rules; and if an actor external to the EU policy process—like the ECJ or a foreign court or agency—creates new informal rules, then Member State principals may not be willing to pay the costs of “overruling” them via new legislation even when they prefer to do so.  An ex ante prediction, based on past activities in the EU’s informal sphere, is that the second and seventh hypotheses will find supporting evidence in this section’s empirical material.
The U.S.-EU rivalry in the area of merger control is puzzling in light of the considerable degree to which these entities have cooperated on most all cross-Atlantic commercial issues throughout the postwar era.  While discord over military and other diplomatic issues have been far more common among these allies, by and large economic relations have been rather amicable aside from the occasional disputes over currency valuations and the like.  However, as the Commission came into its own in the 1990s regarding EU merger control, a substantial rift began to develop as the prospect that a merger of two MNCs of American origin could be thwarted by a European regulating agency.  This dispute approached a boiling point when in 1997 it appeared the Commission would block the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas proposed merger, though the situation was able to simmer down after the merger was modified more to the Commission’s satisfaction—but only after a lot of disquiet and high-level diplomacy.
A boiling point was subsequently reached, however, when it became clear in the spring of 2001 that the Commission would not allow the proposed GE-Honeywell merger—two massive U.S.-based MNCs with the seeming political punch to match their market share weight around the world.  GE produces an amalgam of products, ranging from small light bulbs to large-scale engines, such as airplane engines; inter alia, it is a leasing agent of civilian airplanes.  Honeywell is both a manufacturing and technology company; inter alia, via its aerospace division it is one of the leading producers of flight control systems.  
Already having difficulty with a prior acquisition of Allied Signal, when sales figures slumped significantly in 2000, Honeywell put itself up for sale.  GE and United Technologies entered a bidding war, which culminated when GE trumped UT with a $42 billion bid in late 2000.  Had the attempted merger panned out, at $40 billion it would have been one of the more sizable mergers of two sprawling industrial groups to date—GE itself being the world’s largest firm.  As such, there was great anticipation in the markets for a successful merger, which was boosted by the outsized personality of its CEO, Jack Welch.
But GE was caught off guard in February 2001 when, instead of receiving the expedited regulatory treatment it was expecting, the Commission signaled its intent to subject the two firms to a full multi-phase merger enquiry.  The EU was not the only important entity planning to subject these two behemoths to oversight, for the U.S. DOJ was also getting into the act in early 2001.  At first there appeared to be little divergence in the approach of the DOJ and the Commission, who were hoping to avoid the acrimony surrounding the 1997 battle via relying on some informal confidence building measures shared among their top officials.  Indeed, at the outset their initial actions boded well, for both agencies announced that GE would be required to pay some divestitures in order to take charge of Honeywell.  However, before very long a divergence opened up between the two regulatory approaches taken.
While the DOJ was preparing a broadly favorable review by the end of spring, the officials under Commissioner Mario Monti in the Competition DG were gravitating toward a position requiring substantial additional divestitures.  The May 2001 DOJ ruling merely insisted the firms find a new provider of maintenance services for Honeywell’s airplane engine unit and divest its military helicopter division, while being fairly favorable overall.  Despite the widening divergence, the Commission and DOJ continued to engage in cooperative, even fairly intense, contacts and communications—based on the confidence building measures agreed to in the aftermath of the Boeing skirmish.  Indeed, there is evidence of philosophical convergence, e.g. the 1998 Commission adoption of the Market Definition Notice (based on the DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines).  The Commission was also relying to a greater degree on economics in its approach to “new economy” mergers, and consultations on multiple mergers had been substantial.  It would prove to be the case that, when the dust finally settled, neither side felt that the other was in any way uncooperative—on the contrary.  The differences in substance, however, would prove insurmountable.
When the Commission would not budge on the divestiture issue, a phalanx of GE executives headed by Welch arrived in Brussels in an effort to salvage the merger.  Knowing their compromise proposal fell short of what Commission officials were insisting on, GE proposed to sell off its $2.2 billion aerospace division and turn its airplane leasing agent, GE Capital Aviation Services (GECAS), into an “arms length” entity regarding Honeywell’s products that would still be owned by GE but operate independently.  Still resisted by the Commission, the GE offer was sweetened on June 28—by offering to sell a minority interest in GECAS—in a last ditch attempt to get  an acceptable deal.  Yet this too proved too little too late in Monti and his officials’ eyes, insufficient to assuage their concerns about harm to competition; hence, on July 3 it acted to formally block the merger.  In the end, despite the widespread cross-Atlantic consultation, the disparate approaches and their underlying antitrust philosophies toward competition policy proved irreconcilable.
The result ignited something of a furor in the immediate aftermath of the Commission’s decision, which lasted into the new year.  While a bevy of U.S. officials accused the Commission of being out of sync with global competition trends, Commission officials defended themselves vigorously by pointing to the unprecedented degree of DOJ-Commission cooperation leading up to the decision.  Called into question by U.S. officials—inside and outside the DOJ—were the Commission’s credibility and its very competence, beyond the dim view the American’s took of EU law and the substance of the decision itself.  But the Commission’s campaign to portray the U.S. attack as overstated was soon undermined by criticism from within Europe.  
What sent the Competition DG really reeling, however, was the subsequent affront to its competition policy from within the EU itself, viz. the European Court of First Instance (CFI).  In June 2002 the CFI overturned the Commission’s previous decision to block the proposed Airtours/First Choice merger—the first occasion on which such a decision had been voided—before going on to overturn two additional blockage decisions (while still awaiting two pending appeals, including one of the GE/Honeywell decision; Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Lavel/Sidel were also overturned).  This series of events seemed to coalesce the varying sentiments, throughout the press and government circles, narrowing them to a view that the Commission’s fundamental competition philosophy was flawed.
Interestingly, the Commission had already initiated a review of the European Council’s Merger Regulation (ECMR), which had been in the pipeline since 2000 followed by a 2001 Green Paper (the ECMR was first agreed in 1990 and then formally updated in 1998).  The official responses to the Green Paper had been mild, attracting little attention.  Yet, in the wake of the CFI’s consistently scathing criticism of Monti et al., the Council, Parliament, and Commission took a great deal more interest in the issue—sparking wide internal reflection and not a few frank admissions of failure.  Beginning with draft Horizontal Merger Guidelines and a draft Merger Regulation in December 2002, the review process culminated in a new ECMR that entered into force on May 1, 2004—coupled with a package of implementing regulations, staff reforms, and enforcement guidelines.  The crux of this overhaul involves changes to horizontal mergers analysis, the Commission’s jurisdiction, the substantive merger standard, the timing of review stages, and a new package of best practices for staff during reviews.  Moreover, it offers further evidence of cross-Atlantic competition convergence, albeit incomplete in that substantive philosophical differences remain in particular regard to the Commission’s ongoing antipathy to market dominance (i.e. competitor welfare) vs. the priority the DOJ gives to consumer welfare.
In addition to the chain of events set off by the Commission’s GE-Honeywell blocking decision inside the EU, the episode set off a parallel chain of events outside the EU.  Notwithstanding the furor whose intensity remained for at least a year, attempts at furthering cross-Atlantic competition comity were actually initiated in the near aftermath.  Officials realized that despite the criticism being hurled around publicly, privately they needed to begin the tough work of cooperating—viz. harmonizing their merger review approaches so as to avoid future conflict.  The Commission and DOJ—along with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—set up a high level joint working group in 2002, called the US-EU Merger Working Group.  The officials appointed to this group worked rapidly to hammer out a set of guidelines to govern cross-Atlantic regulation of mergers, and were about midway in their efforts by August; these were publicized on October 30 as “Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations.”  The primary aim of the joint guidelines is to better coordinate procedures for respective antitrust reviews of mergers and acquisitions that are subject to both jurisdictions, specifically to reduce the likelihood of conflicting or inconsistent outcomes, as well as to coordinate the timing of U.S. and EU investigations.
According to the preamble, “this statement of best practices seeks to set out the conditions under which trans-Atlantic inter-agency cooperation in merger investigations should be conducted, while at the same time confirming and building on current good practice.” ​[19]​  The context of the best practice guidelines boils down to four major joint commitments:  1) to confer on timetables with EU and US staffs jointly before filing notifications  2) to agree to parallel timetables for filings and reviews of transactions  3) to waive confidentiality to permit the sharing of documents and information produced by the parties, and  4) to permit joint EU-US interview and discovery.  Prior to this informal accord, the DOJ and Commission were already engaging in a fair amount of consultation and coordination; however, the accord not only institutionalizes these practices to a significant extent, but also commits the parties to consult and coordinate with greater frequency and to a greater degree.  
The document identifies five goals in this regard:  1) closer consultation on market definition, competitive effects, theories of harm, efficiencies, economic theories, empirical evidence, and remedies  2) designation of contact persons at the respective agencies to establish a schedule for consultation and coordination at the onset of investigations  3) coordination by agency personnel at various levels at specified stages of the investigation  4) attendance by representatives of one agency at key events of other agencies, such as the EU’s Oral Hearing or a party’s presentation to the Assistant Attorney General or FTC Bureau Director, and  5) closer and earlier consultation on remedies in an effort to avoid imposing inconsistent obligations on the parties in the respective jurisdictions.  Although the guidelines are largely limited to procedural considerations, a distinctive spirit of philosophical convergence is at work and likely to be a part of the impact of this accord beyond procedural matters.
Although the best practice guidelines have the official quality merely of recommendations with no legal force whatsoever, their influence appears consequential—the lack of formality notwithstanding.  The guidelines amount to newly created informal institutions from a source external to the EU.  Despite their external origin, however, the impact of the rules is internal as well as external (at the FTC and DOJ); the impact is discernible in the subsequent reform of the ECMR, which took place nearly two years later.  Yet it remains to be seen whether the best practice aims have been achieved, the accomplishment of which naturally depends on the will of both parties to cooperate and adhere to the guidelines.  The guidelines explicitly state that any party’s choice not to adhere to any element thereof will not affect the conduct or outcome of either party’s investigations.  Yet, despite their lack of a legal quality, their violation is likely to involve an enforcement approach similar to that of informal accords inside the EU, viz. that of informally issuing political sanctions when violations occur (some form of an action by the aggrieved party to reduce cooperation with the other and link this to the alleged violation).

Conclusion
The empirics of this case shed light on the distinct possibility that the sources of informal dynamics that have an internal EU impact may in fact be external; herein lies the potential for a new set of research inquiries into how informal governance—whether precedent setting in the case of informal dynamics or not—may stem not only from EU actors like the Council or the ECJ, but also international organizations, foreign courts, or foreign bureaucratic agencies.  In this instance of informal dynamics in the area of competition policy, the rule creation was a joint effort of competition agencies in the EU and the U.S.  Other instances of external informal dynamics with an internal EU resonance are likely to abound.
In terms of RCHI theory and its hypotheses tested in this section, Hypotheses 1, 4, 5, and 6 are rejected by the empirical evidence herein (each is a considerable mismatch with this type of empirical material)—as well as Hypothesis 3:  Member States have yet to exhibit any interest in formalizing any of the best practices guidelines for merger reviews, i.e. by sweeping them up into the Treaty.  However, at least partly confirmatory evidence was found for Hypotheses 2 and 7.  In this case, the Commission was dissatisfied with the status quo set of uninstitutionalized practices for joint EU-U.S. coordination in cross-Atlantic merger regulation and in response to its own inadequacies sought along with the DOJ to create new informal rules for the purpose of solving the problem of cross-Atlantic discord and the repercussions for MNCs.  Furthermore, regarding Hypothesis 7, an actor external to the EU participated in creating new informal rules with an internal EU impact, and Member States were not willing to overrule them by new formal legislation.
On a parting note, the U.S. and EU are far from being out of the woods regarding conflict and cooperation in the area of merger regulation.  At the time of this writing, the DOJ and Commission are at it again with regard to a wide discrepancy in their review of Microsoft’s alleged unfair competition.  In late March 2004 the Commission, still under Monti’s leadership, slapped a record $612 million fine on Microsoft for alleged abuse of its dominant market position in computer software and operating systems.  The Competition DG believes that Microsoft’s practice of bundling its Media Player program with its Windows operating system—thereby leveraging its Windows virtual monopoly into other markets—amounts to unfair competition; whereas the DOJ adamantly holds precisely the opposite position and has publicly criticized the Commission.  Microsoft is currently appealing the decision to the CFI, and the ruling is pending.  
Interestingly, however, the joint best practices guidelines have been upheld throughout the review processes on both sides of the Atlantic; neither side disputes this conclusion.  Thus, it is apparent that while the U.S. and EU are abiding by the new informal institutions they jointly created, these alone may not calm the waters; moreover, the anticipated positive spillover effects into the philosophical substance, has yet to be confirmed by the evidence to date.  Clearly, however, numerous additional cases are required to determine the procedural and philosophical effects of the attempt to use informal dynamics to reduce cross-Atlantic discord in this key are of economic policy.
This paper has attempted to apply RCHI theory to a new type of empirical case studies, viz. one external to the EU.  Two of the theory’s key hypotheses were confirmed, therein leading to a preliminary conclusion that consequential informal inter-organizational dynamics—a subset of informal governance—have occurred in the past several years in the evolution of cross-Atlantic coordination of merger reviews.  Indeed, this may point toward the need for further research into external sources of informal governance that impact the EU internally.
	Thus, even while the EU has acted in the formal sphere of European integration to transform the Treaty into an official EU Constitution, the channeling of political actors’ behavior in the EU via dynamics in the informal sphere continues apace.  Moreover, it is apparent that informal governance in the EU is in evidence in two primary forms:  precedent setting via the creation of new informal institutions and non-precedent setting via the making of consequential decisions by various actors.  The former, known as informal inter-organizational dynamics, is evident in the multitude of informal accords created by one or more of the Three; whereas the latter, known as network-based governance, is evident in the multitude of policy networks in the EU that are responsible for different decisions at different times and places.  
Interesting avenues for further research involve ascertaining under what conditions network-based governance gets transformed into informal inter-organizational dynamics, as well as under what conditions Member States choose to formalize extant informal institutions.  One conclusion, however, is clear beyond any reasonable doubt:  the integration outcome in the EU, involving the sharing of power and transfer of sovereignty, cannot be fully explained by confining one’s scholarly lens to history-making integration.  Indeed, interregnum integration is in evidence, for the remaining variance of the integration outcome cannot be explained without acknowledging the informal dynamics that involve consequential rule changes in the interregnum between Member State treaty negotiations.
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